| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12588 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12588 |
| Optimal Inequality\/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament | |
| Richard B. Freeman; Alexander M. Gelber | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-10-13 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines performance in a tournament setting with different levels of inequality in rewards and different provision of information about individual's skill at the task prior to the tournament. We find that that total tournament output depends on inequality according to an inverse U shaped function: We reward subjects based on the number of mazes they can solve, and the number of solved mazes is lowest when payments are independent of the participants' performance; rises to a maximum at a medium level of inequality; then falls at the highest level of inequality. These results are strongest when participants know the number of mazes they solved relative to others in a pre-tournament round and thus can judge their likely success in the tournament. Finally, we find that cheating/fudging on the experiment responds to the level of inequality and information about relative positions. Our results support a model of optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments that postulate convex cost of effort functions. |
| 主题 | Other ; General, Teaching ; Public Economics ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12588 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570249 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard B. Freeman,Alexander M. Gelber. Optimal Inequality\/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12588.pdf（201KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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