| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12653 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12653 |
| Political Competitiveness | |
| Casey B. Mulligan; Kevin K. Tsui | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Political competitiveness - which many interpret as the degree of democracy - can be modeled as a monopolistic competition. All regimes are constrained by the threat of "entry," and thereby seek some combination of popular support and political entry barriers. This simple model predicts that many public policies are unrelated to political competitiveness, and that even unchallenged nondemocratic regimes should tax far short of their Laffer curve maximum. Economic sanctions, odious debt repudiation, and other policies designed to punish dictators can have the unintended consequences of increasing oppression and discouraging competition. Since entry barriers are a form of increasing returns, democratic countries (defined according to low entry barriers) are more likely to subdivide and nondemocratic countries are more likely to merge. These and other predictions are consistent with previous empirical findings on comparative public finance, election contests, international conflict, the size of nations, and the Lipset hypothesis. As in the private sector, the number of competitors is not necessarily a good indicator of public sector competitiveness. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12653 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570315 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Casey B. Mulligan,Kevin K. Tsui. Political Competitiveness. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12653.pdf（251KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
