| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w12705
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 12705
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| Basel II: A Contracting Perspective |
| Edward J. Kane
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| 发表日期 | 2006-11-17
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Financial safety nets are incomplete social contracts that assign responsibility to various economic sectors for preventing, detecting, and paying for potentially crippling losses at financial institutions. This paper uses the theories of incomplete contracts and sequential bargaining to interpret the Basel Accords as a framework for endlessly renegotiating minimal duties and standards of safety-net management across the community of nations. Modelling the stakes and stakeholders represented by different regulators helps us to understand that inconsistencies exist in prior understandings about the range of sectoral effects that the 2004 Basel II agreement might produce. The analysis seeks to explain why, in the U.S., attempting to resolve these inconsistencies has spawned an embarrassingly fractious debate and repeatedly pushed back Basel II's scheduled implementation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Financial Institutions
; Corporate Finance
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12705
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570368
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Edward J. Kane. Basel II: A Contracting Perspective. 2006.
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文件名：
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w12705.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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