| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12771 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12771 |
| Lucky CEOs | |
| Lucian A. Bebchuk; Yaniv Grinstein; Urs Peyer | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky grant -- defined as grants given at the lowest price of the month -- due to opportunistic timing. Lucky grants were more likely when the board did not have a majority of independent directors and/or the CEO had longer tenure -- factors associated with increased influence of the CEO on pay-setting. We find no evidence that gains from manipulated grants served as a substitute for compensation paid through other sources; total reported compensation from such sources was higher in firms providing lucky grants. Finally, opportunistic timing has been widespread throughout the economy, with a significant presence in each of the economy's twelve (Fama-French) industries. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12771 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570432 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian A. Bebchuk,Yaniv Grinstein,Urs Peyer. Lucky CEOs. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12771.pdf（247KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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