| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12776 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12776 |
| Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Steven Shavell | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a model in which firms are able to acquire information about product risks and may or may not be required to disclose this information. We initially study the effect of disclosure rules assuming that firms are not liable for the harm caused by their products. Although mandatory disclosure obviously is superior to voluntary disclosure given the information about product risks that firms possess -- since such information has value to consumers -- voluntary disclosure induces firms to acquire more information about product risks because they can keep silent if the information is unfavorable. The latter effect could lead to higher social welfare under voluntary disclosure. The same results hold if firms are liable for harm under the negligence standard of liability. Under strict liability, however, firms are indifferent about revealing information concerning product risk, and mandatory and voluntary disclosure rules are equivalent. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12776 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570436 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Steven Shavell. Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12776.pdf（168KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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