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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w12784
来源IDWorking Paper 12784
Regulating Misinformation
Edward L. Glaeser; Gergely Ujhelyi
发表日期2006-12-20
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要The government has responded to misleading advertising by banning it, engaging in counter-advertising and taxing the product. In this paper, we consider the social welfare effects of those different responses to misinformation. While misinformation lowers consumer surplus, its effect on social welfare is ambiguous. Misleading advertising leads to overconsumption but that may be offsetting the under-consumption associated with monopoly prices. If all advertising is misinformation then a tax or quantity restriction on advertising maximizes social welfare. Other policy interventions are inferior and cannot improve on a pure advertising tax. If it is impossible to tax misleading information without also taxing utility increasing advertising, then combining taxes or bans on advertising with other policies can increase welfare.
主题Other ; General, Teaching
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w12784
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570444
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GB/T 7714
Edward L. Glaeser,Gergely Ujhelyi. Regulating Misinformation. 2006.
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