| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12784 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12784 |
| Regulating Misinformation | |
| Edward L. Glaeser; Gergely Ujhelyi | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The government has responded to misleading advertising by banning it, engaging in counter-advertising and taxing the product. In this paper, we consider the social welfare effects of those different responses to misinformation. While misinformation lowers consumer surplus, its effect on social welfare is ambiguous. Misleading advertising leads to overconsumption but that may be offsetting the under-consumption associated with monopoly prices. If all advertising is misinformation then a tax or quantity restriction on advertising maximizes social welfare. Other policy interventions are inferior and cannot improve on a pure advertising tax. If it is impossible to tax misleading information without also taxing utility increasing advertising, then combining taxes or bans on advertising with other policies can increase welfare. |
| 主题 | Other ; General, Teaching |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12784 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570444 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edward L. Glaeser,Gergely Ujhelyi. Regulating Misinformation. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12784.pdf（443KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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