| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12785 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12785 |
| Online Auctions | |
| Axel Ockenfels; David Reiley; Abdolkarim Sadrieh | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules). |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12785 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570445 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Axel Ockenfels,David Reiley,Abdolkarim Sadrieh. Online Auctions. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12785.pdf（882KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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