全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Immigration and the Survival of Social Security: A Political Economy Model

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来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w12800
来源ID	Working Paper 12800
	Immigration and the Survival of Social Security: A Political Economy Model
	Edith Sand; Assaf Razin
发表日期	2006-12-29
出版年	2006
语种	英语
摘要	In the political debate people express the idea that immigrants are good because they can help pay for the old. The paper explores this idea in a dynamic political-economy setup. For this purpose we develop an OLG political economy model of social security and migration. We characterize sub-game perfect Markov equilibria where immigration policy and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system are jointly determined through a majority voting process. The main feature of the model is that immigrants are desirable for the sustainability of the social security system because the political system is able to manipulate the ratio of old to young and thereby the coalition which supports future high social security benefits. We demonstrate that the older is the native born population the more likely is that the immigration policy is liberalized and the social security system survives.
主题	International Economics ; International Factor Mobility ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w12800
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570463
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Edith Sand,Assaf Razin. Immigration and the Survival of Social Security: A Political Economy Model. 2006.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w12800.pdf（348KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览