| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12811 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12811 |
| Lucky Directors | |
| Lucian A. Bebchuk; Yaniv Grinstein; Urs Peyer | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-29 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events in which public firms granted options to outside directors during 1996-2005, we find that 9% were "lucky grant events" falling on days with a stock price equal to a monthly low. We estimate that about 800 lucky grant events owed their status to opportunistic timing, and that about 460 firms and 1400 outside directors were associated with grant events produced by such timing. There is evidence that the opportunistic timing of director grant events has been to a substantial extent the product of backdating and not merely spring-loading based on private information. We find that directors' luck has been correlated with executives' luck. Furthermore, grant events were more likely to be lucky when the firm had more entrenching provisions protecting insiders from the risk of removal, as well as when the board did not have a majority of independent directors. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12811 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570474 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian A. Bebchuk,Yaniv Grinstein,Urs Peyer. Lucky Directors. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12811.pdf（541KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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