| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12851 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12851 |
| The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century | |
| Efraim Benmelech; Tobias J. Moskowitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; History ; Financial History ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12851 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570517 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Efraim Benmelech,Tobias J. Moskowitz. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12851.pdf（418KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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