| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12855 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12855 |
| Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets | |
| Pol Antràs; Mihir A. Desai; C. Fritz Foley | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines how costly financial contracting and weak investor protection influence the cross-border operational, financing and investment decisions of firms. We develop a model in which product developers have a comparative advantage in monitoring the deployment of their technology abroad. The paper demonstrates that when firms want to exploit technologies abroad, multinational firm (MNC) activity and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows arise endogenously when monitoring is nonverifiable and financial frictions exist. The mechanism generating MNC activity is not the risk of technological expropriation by local partners but the demands of external funders who require MNC participation to ensure value maximization by local entrepreneurs. The model demonstrates that weak investor protections limit the scale of multinational firm activity, increase the reliance on FDI flows and alter the decision to deploy technology through FDI as opposed to arm's length licensing. Several distinctive predictions for the impact of weak investor protection on MNC activity and FDI flows are tested and confirmed using firm-level data. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Factor Mobility ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12855 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570521 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pol Antràs,Mihir A. Desai,C. Fritz Foley. Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12855.pdf（466KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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