| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12875 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12875 |
| Transparency and Corporate Governance | |
| Benjamin E. Hermalin; Michael S. Weisbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-01-30 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An objective of many proposed corporate governance reforms is increased transparency. This goal has been relatively uncontroversial, as most observers believe increased transparency to be unambiguously good. We argue that, from a corporate governance perspective, there are likely to be both costs and benefits to increased transparency, leading to an optimum level beyond which increasing transparency lowers profits. This result holds even when there is no direct cost of increasing transparency and no issue of revealing information to regulators or product-market rivals. We show that reforms that seek to increase transparency can reduce firm profits, raise executive compensation, and inefficiently increase the rate of CEO turnover. We further consider the possibility that executives will take actions to distort information. We show that executives could have incentives, due to career concerns, to increase transparency and that increases in penalties for distorting information can be profit reducing. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12875 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570541 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin E. Hermalin,Michael S. Weisbach. Transparency and Corporate Governance. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12875.pdf（223KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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