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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w12902 |
来源ID | Working Paper 12902 |
Antitrust and Regulation | |
Dennis W. Carlton; Randal C. Picker | |
发表日期 | 2007-02-16 |
出版年 | 2007 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points. |
主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Regulatory Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12902 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570568 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dennis W. Carlton,Randal C. Picker. Antitrust and Regulation. 2007. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w12902.pdf(181KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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