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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w12902
来源IDWorking Paper 12902
Antitrust and Regulation
Dennis W. Carlton; Randal C. Picker
发表日期2007-02-16
出版年2007
语种英语
摘要Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points.
主题Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Regulatory Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w12902
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570568
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Dennis W. Carlton,Randal C. Picker. Antitrust and Regulation. 2007.
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