全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Mediocracy

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w12920
来源ID	Working Paper 12920
	Mediocracy
	Andrea Mattozzi; Antonio Merlo
发表日期	2007-02-21
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w12920
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570586
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Andrea Mattozzi,Antonio Merlo. Mediocracy. 2007.