| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12952 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12952 |
| A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 | |
| Yael V. Hochberg; Paola Sapienza; Annette Vissing-Jorgensen | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation, and compare their returns to the returns of less affected firms. Cumulative returns during the four and a half months leading up to passage of SOX were approximately 10 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms. Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors' positive expectations with regards to the effects of the law were warranted for the enhanced disclosure provisions of SOX. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12952 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570618 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yael V. Hochberg,Paola Sapienza,Annette Vissing-Jorgensen. A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12952.pdf（435KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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