| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13014 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13014 |
| Human Capital, Bankruptcy and Capital Structure | |
| Jonathan B. Berk; Richard Stanton; Josef Zechner | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-04-02 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We derive a firm's optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk, while equity holders can diversify this risk away. In the presence of corporate taxes, our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice. It also makes a number of predictions for the cross-sectional distribution of firm leverage. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, it implies persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms. An important new empirical prediction of the model is that, ceteris paribus, firms with more leverage should pay higher wages. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13014 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570681 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan B. Berk,Richard Stanton,Josef Zechner. Human Capital, Bankruptcy and Capital Structure. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13014.pdf（320KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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