| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13028 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13028 |
| The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics | |
| Timothy Besley; Torsten Persson | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-04-10 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economists generally assume the existence of sufficient institutions to sustain a market economy and tax the citizens. However, this starting point cannot easily be taken for granted in many states, neither in history nor in the developing world of today. This paper develops a framework where "policy choices", regulation of markets and tax rates, are constrained by "economic institutions", which in turn reflect past investments in legal and fiscal state capacity. We study the economic and political determinants of these investments. The analysis shows that common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Preliminary empirical evidence based on cross-country data find a number of correlations consistent with the theory. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13028 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570695 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Timothy Besley,Torsten Persson. The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13028.pdf（423KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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