| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13061 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13061 |
| Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to Public Acquirers? | |
| Leonce Bargeron; Frederik Schlingemann; Rene M. Stulz; Chad Zutter | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-04-26 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We find that the announcement gain to target shareholders from acquisitions is significantly lower if a private firm instead of a public firm makes the acquisition. Non-operating firms like private equity funds make the majority of private bidder acquisitions. On average, target shareholders receive 55% more if a public firm instead of a private equity fund makes the acquisition. There is no evidence that the difference in premiums is driven by observable differences in targets. We find that target shareholder gains depend critically on the managerial ownership of the bidder. In particular, there is no difference in target shareholder gains between acquisitions made by public bidders with high managerial ownership and by private bidders. Such evidence suggests that the differences in managerial incentives between private and public firms have an important impact on target shareholder gains from acquisitions and managers of firms with diffuse ownership may pay too much for acquisitions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13061 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570729 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leonce Bargeron,Frederik Schlingemann,Rene M. Stulz,et al. Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to Public Acquirers?. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13061.pdf（163KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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