| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13067 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13067 |
| Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending | |
| William Adams; Liran Einav; Jonathan Levin | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-04-26 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might give rise to them. Our analysis is based on unique data from a large auto sales company that serves the subprime market. We first document the role of short-term liquidity in driving purchasing behavior, including sharp increases in demand during tax rebate season and a high sensitivity to minimum down payment requirements. We then explore the informational problems facing subprime lenders. We find that default rates rise significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for lenders to impose loan caps because of moral hazard. We also find that borrowers at the highest risk of default demand the largest loans, but the degree of adverse selection is mitigated substantially by effective risk-based pricing. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13067 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570735 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | William Adams,Liran Einav,Jonathan Levin. Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13067.pdf（317KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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