| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13069 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13069 |
| Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration | |
| Glenn Ellison; Sara Fisher Ellison | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-04-26 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a new approach to testing for strategic entry deterrence and applies it to the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents just before they lose patent protection. The approach involves looking at a cross-section of markets and examining whether behavior is nonmonotonic in the size of the market. Under certain conditions, investment levels will be monotone in market size if firms are not influenced by a desire to deter entry. Strategic investments, however, may be nonmonotone because entry deterrence is unnecessary in very small markets and impossible in very large ones, resulting in overall nonmonotonic investment. The pharmaceutical data contain advertising, product proliferation, and pricing information for a sample of drugs which lost patent protection between 1986 and 1992. Among the findings consistent with an entry deterrence motivation are that incumbents in markets of intermediate size have lower levels of advertising and are more likely to reduce advertising immediately prior to patent expiration. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13069 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570737 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Glenn Ellison,Sara Fisher Ellison. Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13069.pdf（335KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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