| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13122 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13122 |
| Political Dynasties | |
| Ernesto Dal Bó; Pedro Dal Bó; Jason Snyder | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-05-24 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; History ; Other History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13122 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570790 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ernesto Dal Bó,Pedro Dal Bó,Jason Snyder. Political Dynasties. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13122.pdf（360KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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