全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Trust and Social Collateral

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w13126
来源ID	Working Paper 13126
	Trust and Social Collateral
	Markus Mobius; Adam Szeidl
发表日期	2007-05-24
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum amount that one can borrow from the other, and derive a simple reduced form expression for trust as a function of the social network. We show that trust is higher in more connected and more homogenous societies, and relate our trust measure to commonly used network statistics. Our model predicts that dense networks generate greater welfare when arrangements typically require high trust, and loose networks create more welfare otherwise. Using data on social networks and behavior in dictator games, we document evidence consistent with the quantitative predictions of the model.
主题	Microeconomics ; Households and Firms
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w13126
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570794
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Markus Mobius,Adam Szeidl. Trust and Social Collateral. 2007.