| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w13177
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 13177
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| Interest Rate Rules, Inflation Stabilization, and Imperfect Credibility: The Small Open Economy Case |
| Guillermo A. Calvo
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| 发表日期 | 2007-06-14
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| 出版年 | 2007
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The paper examines the robustness of Interest Rate Rules, IRRs, in the context of an imperfectly credible stabilization program, closely following the format of much of the literature in open-economy models, e.g., Calvo and Végh (1993 and 1999). A basic result is that IRRs, like Exchange Rate Based Stabilization, ERBS, programs, could give rise to macroeconomic distortion, e.g., underutilization of capacity and real exchange rate misalignment. However, while under imperfect credibility EBRS is associated with overheating and current account deficits, IRRs give rise to somewhat opposite results. Moreover, the paper shows that popular policies to counteract misalignment, like Strategic Foreign Exchange Market Intervention or Controls on International Capital Mobility may not be effective or could even become counterproductive. The bottom line is that the greater exchange rate flexibility granted by IRRs is by far not a sure shot against the macroeconomic costs infringed by imperfect credibility. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Monetary Policy
; International Economics
; International Finance
; International Macroeconomics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13177
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570846
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Guillermo A. Calvo. Interest Rate Rules, Inflation Stabilization, and Imperfect Credibility: The Small Open Economy Case. 2007.
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文件名：
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w13177.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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