| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13202 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13202 |
| Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value | |
| Rüdiger Fahlenbrach; René M. Stulz | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. The probability of large decreases in ownership is strongly increasing in contemporaneous and past stock returns but the probability of large increases in ownership through managerial purchases of shares is not. The relation between changes in Tobin's q and past and contemporaneous changes in ownership depends critically on controlling for past stock returns. When controlling for past stock returns, past large decreases in managerial ownership are unrelated to current changes in Tobin's q but there is some evidence that past large increases in managerial ownership are positively related to current changes in Tobin's q. Because managers sell shares when a firm's stock is performing well, large contemporaneous decreases in managerial ownership are associated with increases in Tobin's q. We argue that our evidence is mostly inconsistent with existing theories and propose a managerial discretion theory of ownership consistent with our evidence. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13202 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570871 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rüdiger Fahlenbrach,René M. Stulz. Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13202.pdf（241KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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