| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13310 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13310 |
| Coalition-Proof Trade and the Friedman Rule in the Lagos-Wright Model | |
| Tai-wei Hu; John Kennan; Neil Wallace | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-08-07 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The Lagos-Wright model -- a monetary model in which pairwise meetings alternate in time with a centralized meeting -- has been extensively analyzed, but always using particular trading protocols. Here, trading protocols are replaced by two alternative notions of implementability: one that allows only individual defections and one that also allows cooperative defections in meetings. It is shown that the first-best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion with- out taxation if people are sufficiently patient. And, if people are free to skip the centralized meeting, then lump-sum taxation used to pay interest on money does not enlarge the set of implementable allocations. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13310 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570982 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tai-wei Hu,John Kennan,Neil Wallace. Coalition-Proof Trade and the Friedman Rule in the Lagos-Wright Model. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13310.pdf（310KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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