| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w13321
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 13321
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| Strategic Judicial Decision Making |
| Pablo T. Spiller; Rafael Gely
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| 发表日期 | 2007-08-21
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| 出版年 | 2007
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This survey paper starts from the basic, and intuitive, assumption that judges are human and as such, can be modeled in the same fashion we model politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, behaving in a purposive and forward-looking fashion. We explore, then, the role politics play in judicial decision-making. We provide a brief overview of what is called the "strategic approach," compare it to alternative approaches to understand judicial behavior, and offer some concluding thoughts about the future of positive analyses of judicial decision-making. |
| 主题 | Other
; Law and Economics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13321
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570993
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Pablo T. Spiller,Rafael Gely. Strategic Judicial Decision Making. 2007.
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文件名：
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w13321.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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