| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13339 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13339 |
| Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use? | |
| Dennis W. Carlton; Joshua S. Gans; Michael Waldman | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-08-21 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the option to use the monopolist's complementary good -- do not use it. The tie is profitable because it alters the subsequent pricing game between the monopolist and the rival in a manner favorable to the monopolist. We show that this form of tying is socially inefficient, but interestingly can arise only when the tie is socially efficient in the absence of the rival producer. We relate this inefficient form of tying to several actual examples and explore its antitrust implications. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13339 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571009 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dennis W. Carlton,Joshua S. Gans,Michael Waldman. Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use?. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13339.pdf（223KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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