| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13400 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13400 |
| Aid Volatility and Poverty Traps | |
| Pierre-Richard Agénor; Joshua Aizenman | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-09-12 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the impact of aid volatility in a two-period model where production may occur with either a traditional or a modern technology. Public spending is productive and "time to build" requires expenditure in both periods for the modern technology to be used. The possibility of a poverty trap induced by high aid volatility is first examined in a benchmark case where taxation is absent. The analysis is then extended to account for self insurance (taking the form of a first-period contingency fund) financed through taxation. An increase in aid volatility is shown to raise the optimal contingency fund. But if future aid also depends on the size of the contingency fund (as a result of a moral hazard effect on donors' behavior), the optimal policy may entail no self insurance. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13400 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571072 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre-Richard Agénor,Joshua Aizenman. Aid Volatility and Poverty Traps. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13400.pdf（269KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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