| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13559 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13559 |
| Enforcement Problems and Secondary Markets | |
| Fernando A. Broner; Alberto Martin; Jaume Ventura | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-10-26 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies. But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13559 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571234 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fernando A. Broner,Alberto Martin,Jaume Ventura. Enforcement Problems and Secondary Markets. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13559.pdf（133KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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