| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13562 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13562 |
| Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others | |
| Aaron Edlin; Andrew Gelman; Noah Kaplan | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-10-26 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | For voters with "social" preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. The main contributions of this paper are: (1) to show how, for an individual with both selfish and social preferences, the social preferences will dominate and make it rational for a typical person to vote even in large elections;(2) to show that rational socially-motivated voting has a feedback mechanism that stabilizes turnout at reasonable levels (e.g., 50% of the electorate); (3) to link the rational social-utility model of voter turnout with survey findings on socially-motivated vote choice. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13562 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571237 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aaron Edlin,Andrew Gelman,Noah Kaplan. Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13562.pdf（202KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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