| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13570 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13570 |
| Corporate Financial Policies With Overconfident Managers | |
| Ulrike Malmendier; Geoffrey Tate; Jonathan Yan | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-11-02 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many financing choices of US corporations remain puzzling even after accounting for standard determinants such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information. We propose that managerial beliefs help to explain the remaining variation across and within firms, including variation in debt conservatism and in pecking-order behavior. Managers who believe that their company is undervalued view external financing as overpriced, especially equity financing. As a result, they display pecking-order preferences for internal financing over debt and for debt over equity. They may also exhibit debt conservatism: While they prefer debt to equity, they still underutilize debt relative to its tax benefits. We test these hypotheses empirically, using late option exercise by the CEO as a measure of overconfidence. We find that, conditional on accessing public markets, CEOs who personally overinvest in their companies are significantly less likely to issue equity. They raise 33 cents more debt to cover an additional dollar of financing deficit than their peers. Moreover, the frequency with which they access any external finance (debt or equity) is significantly lower, resulting in debt conservatism. The results replicate when identifying managerial overconfidence based on press portrayal as confident or optimistic. We conclude that managerial overconfidence helps to explain variation in corporate financial policies. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; General Equilibrium ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Public Goods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13570 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571245 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ulrike Malmendier,Geoffrey Tate,Jonathan Yan. Corporate Financial Policies With Overconfident Managers. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13570.pdf（407KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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