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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w13679
来源IDWorking Paper 13679
Principal-agent Incentives, Excess Caution, and Market Inefficiency: Evidence From Utility Regulation
Severin Borenstein; Meghan Busse; Ryan Kellogg
发表日期2007-12-20
出版年2007
语种英语
摘要Regulators and firms often use incentive schemes to attract skillful agents and to induce them to put forth effort in pursuit of the principals' goals. Incentive schemes that reward skill and effort, however, may also punish agents for adverse outcomes beyond their control. As a result, such schemes may induce inefficient behavior, as agents try to avoid actions that might make it easier to directly associate a bad outcome with their decisions. In this paper, we study how such caution on the part of individual agents may lead to inefficient market outcomes, focusing on the context of natural gas procurement by regulated public utilities. We posit that a regulated natural gas distribution company may, due to regulatory incentives, engage in excessively cautious behavior by foregoing surplus-increasing gas trades that could be seen ex post as having caused supply curtailments to its customers. We derive testable implications of such behavior and show that the theory is supported empirically in ways that cannot be explained by conventional price risk aversion or other explanations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the reduction in efficient trade caused by the regulatory mechanism is most severe during periods of relatively high demand and low supply, when the benefits of trade would be greatest.
主题Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w13679
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571355
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Severin Borenstein,Meghan Busse,Ryan Kellogg. Principal-agent Incentives, Excess Caution, and Market Inefficiency: Evidence From Utility Regulation. 2007.
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