| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13701 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13701 |
| CEO Centrality | |
| Lucian A. Bebchuk; Martijn Cremers; Urs Peyer | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-12-28 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) higher odds of the CEO's receiving a "lucky" option grant at the lowest price of the month, (iv) greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck in the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (v) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling for performance, and (vi) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and governance that deserves the attention of researchers. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13701 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571377 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian A. Bebchuk,Martijn Cremers,Urs Peyer. CEO Centrality. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13701.pdf（239KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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