全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w13702
来源ID	Working Paper 13702
	Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics
	Lucian A. Bebchuk; Zvika Neeman
发表日期	2007-12-28
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify conditions under which this lobbying game has an inefficiently low equilibrium level of investor protection. Factors that operate to reduce investor protection below its efficient level include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence politicians, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that efficient investor protection would produce for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs (and existing public firms) have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions arising from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital public firms already have. Our analysis generates testable predictions, and can explain existing empirical evidence, regarding the way in which investor protection varies over time and around the world.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w13702
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571378
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lucian A. Bebchuk,Zvika Neeman. Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics. 2007.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w13702.pdf（240KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览