| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13708 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13708 |
| Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan Contracting | |
| John R. Graham; Si Li; Jiaping Qiu | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-12-28 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with the view that banks use tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13708 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571384 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John R. Graham,Si Li,Jiaping Qiu. Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan Contracting. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13708.pdf（453KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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