| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13732 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13732 |
| Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives | |
| Efraim Benmelech; Eugene Kandel; Pietro Veronesi | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-01-09 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information we show that although stock-based compensation causes managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely sub-optimal investment policies. This problem is especially severe for growth firms, whose stock prices then become over-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and earnings performance instead induces a combination of high effort, truth revelation and optimal investments. The model produces numerous predictions that are consistent with the empirical evidence. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13732 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571407 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Efraim Benmelech,Eugene Kandel,Pietro Veronesi. Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13732.pdf（1848KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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