| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13733 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13733 |
| Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa | |
| Robert P. Inman; Daniel L. Rubinfeld | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-01-22 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model of a peaceful transition from autocracy to democracy using federal governance as a constitutional means to protect the economic interests of the once ruling elite. Under "democratic federalism" the constitution creates an annual policy game where the new majority and the elite each control one policy instrument of importance to the other. The game has a stable, stationary equilibrium that the elite may prefer to autocratic rule. We apply our analysis to South Africa's transition from white, elite rule under apartheid to a multi-racial democracy. We calibrate our model to the South African economy at the time of the transition. Stable democratic equilibria exist for plausible estimates of redistributive preferences and rate of time preference ('impatience') of the new majority during the early years of the new democracy. The future of the democratic federal bargain is less certain under the new populist presidency of Jacob Zuma. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13733 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571408 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert P. Inman,Daniel L. Rubinfeld. Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13733.pdf（330KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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