全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w13742
来源ID	Working Paper 13742
	Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation
	Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer
发表日期	2008-01-22
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated value. In this environment, the planner's optimal contract avoids states with high probability of expropriation. The contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with reasonable informational requirements. The bidding variable is a cap on the present value of discounted revenues, and the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract. The basic framework is extended to incorporate government subsidies, unenforceable investment effort and political moral hazard, and the general thrust of the results described above is preserved.
主题	Public Economics ; Taxation ; Environmental and Resource Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w13742
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571416
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Eduardo Engel,Ronald Fischer. Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation. 2008.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w13742.pdf（211KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览