| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13766 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13766 |
| Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets | |
| Michael Ostrovsky; Michael Schwarz | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-01-29 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13766 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571441 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ostrovsky,Michael Schwarz. Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13766.pdf（254KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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