全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Liquidity Risk and Syndicate Structure

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w13802
来源ID	Working Paper 13802
	Liquidity Risk and Syndicate Structure
	Evan Gatev; Philip Strahan
发表日期	2008-02-12
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	We offer a new explanation of loan syndicate structure based on banks' comparative advantage in managing systematic liquidity risk. When a syndicated loan to a rated borrower has systematic liquidity risk, the fraction of passive participant lenders that are banks is about 8% higher than for loans without liquidity risk. In contrast, liquidity risk does not explain the share of banks as lead lenders. Using a new measure of ex-ante liquidity risk exposure, we find further evidence that syndicate participants specialize in liquidity-risk management while lead banks manage lending relationships. Links from transactions deposits to liquidity exposure are about 50% larger at participant banks than at lead arrangers.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w13802
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571477
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Evan Gatev,Philip Strahan. Liquidity Risk and Syndicate Structure. 2008.