| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13830 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13830 |
| Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy | |
| Casey B. Mulligan; Kevin K. Tsui | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-03-07 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a theory of competition for political leadership between incumbent leaders and their challengers in which the possible equilibrium political market structures range from pure monopoly (unchallenged dictatorship) to perfectly competitive (ideal democracy). Leaders are constrained by the threat of "entry" or their ability to tax (or both), so that regimes with no challengers may nonetheless implement policies in the public interest. We offer economic interpretations of why democratic countries are associated with higher wages, why resource abundant countries tend to be nondemocratic, and how technological change affects political development. By focusing on the incentives for political entry, we show how trade sanctions and other policies designed to promote democracy may actually have the unintended consequences of discouraging political competition. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13830 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571505 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Casey B. Mulligan,Kevin K. Tsui. Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13830.pdf（316KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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