| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13856 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13856 |
| The Evolution of a Legal Rule | |
| Anthony Niblett; Richard Posner; Andrei Shleifer | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-03-12 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The efficiency of common law rules is central to achieving efficient resource allocation in a market economy. While many theories suggest reasons why judge-made law should tend toward efficient rules, the question whether the common law actually does converge in commercial areas has remained empirically untested. We create a dataset of 465 state-court appellate decisions involving the application of the Economic Loss Rule in construction disputes and track the evolution of law in this area from 1970 to 2005. We find that over this period the law did not converge to any stable resting point and evolved differently in different states. We find that legal evolution is influenced by plaintiffs' claims, the relative economic power of the parties, and nonbinding federal precedent. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13856 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571530 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anthony Niblett,Richard Posner,Andrei Shleifer. The Evolution of a Legal Rule. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13856.pdf（221KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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