| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13863 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13863 |
| The Other Ex-Ante Moral Hazard in Health | |
| Jay Bhattacharya; Mikko Packalen | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-03-12 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is well known that public or pooled insurance coverage can induce a form of ex-ante moral hazard: people make inefficiently low investments in self-protective activities. This paper points out another ex-ante moral hazard that arises through an induced innovation externality. This alternative mechanism, by contrast, causes people to devote an inefficiently high level of self-protection. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13863 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571537 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jay Bhattacharya,Mikko Packalen. The Other Ex-Ante Moral Hazard in Health. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13863.pdf（386KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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