| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w13895
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 13895
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| Regulation and Supervision: An Ethical Perspective |
| Edward J. Kane
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| 发表日期 | 2008-03-20
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| 出版年 | 2008
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory elements: politically directed subsidies to selected bank borrowers; subsidized provision of explicit or implicit repayment guarantees for the creditors of banks that participate in the credit-allocation scheme; and defective government monitoring and control of the subsidies to leveraged risk-taking that the other two elements produce. In 2007-2008, technological change and regulatory competition simultaneously encouraged incentive-conflicted supervisors to outsource much of their due discipline to credit-rating firms and encouraged banks to securitize their loans in ways that pushed credit risks on poorly underwritten loans into corners of the universe where supervisors and credit-ratings firms would not see them. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Financial Institutions
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13895
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571569
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Edward J. Kane. Regulation and Supervision: An Ethical Perspective. 2008.
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文件名：
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w13895.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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