| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w13907
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 13907
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| Ideology |
| Roland Bénabou
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| 发表日期 | 2008-04-03
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| 出版年 | 2008
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | I develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained (yet individually rational) distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets. In processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education, health insurance, pensions, etc., individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about their future prospects (or their children's) versus the costs of misinformed decisions. Because these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts with realism or denial, endogenous social cognitions emerge. Thus, an equilibrium in which people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain obstinately blind to them, embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government. Conversely, an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez-faire ideology and blind faith in the invisible hand. With public-sector capital, this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to history-dependent dynamics. The model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up constitutional protections for dissenting views, even when ex-post everyone would prefer to ignore unwelcome news. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Welfare and Collective Choice
; Economics of Information
; Public Economics
; Other
; Economic Systems
; Culture
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13907
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571581
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Roland Bénabou. Ideology. 2008.
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文件名：
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w13907.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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