| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13973 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13973 |
| Sell Side School Ties | |
| Lauren Cohen; Andrea Frazzini; Christopher Malloy | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-05-09 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the impact of social networks on agents' ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational backgrounds of sell side equity analysts and senior officers of firms, we test the hypothesis that analysts' school ties to senior officers impart comparative information advantages in the production of analyst research. We find evidence that analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. A simple portfolio strategy of going long the buy recommendations with school ties and going short buy recommendations without ties earns returns of 5.40% per year. We test whether Regulation FD, targeted at impeding selective disclosure, constrained the use of direct access to senior management. We find a large effect: pre-Reg FD the return premium from school ties was 8.16% per year, while post-Reg FD the return premium is nearly zero and insignificant. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the UK), the analyst school-tie premium has remained large and significant over the entire sample period. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13973 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571648 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lauren Cohen,Andrea Frazzini,Christopher Malloy. Sell Side School Ties. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13973.pdf（401KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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