| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14143 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14143 |
| Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections | |
| Alberto F. Alesina; Richard T. Holden | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candidates may wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambiguity balances voter beliefs about the appeal of candidates both to the median voter and to the campaign contributors. If primaries precede a general election, they add another incentive for ambiguity, because in the primaries the candidates do not want to reveal too much information, to maintain some freedom of movement in the policy space for the general election. Ambiguity has an option value. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14143 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571818 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto F. Alesina,Richard T. Holden. Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14143.pdf（196KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
