| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14146 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14146 |
| U.S. Defense Contracts During the Tax Expenditure Battles of the 1980s | |
| Susan Guthrie; James R. Hines, Jr. | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers the impact of the tax treatment of U.S. military contractors. Prior to the early 1980s, taxpayers were permitted to use the completed contract method of accounting to defer taxation of profits earned on long term contracts. Legislation passed in 1982, 1986 and 1987 required that at least 70 percent of the profits earned on long-term contracts be taxed as accrued, thereby significantly reducing the tax benefits associated with long term contracting. Comparing contracts that were ineligible for the tax benefits associated with long term contracting with those that were eligible, it appears that between 1981 and 1989 the duration of U.S. Department of Defense contracts shortened by an average of between one and 3.5 months, or somewhere between 6 and 29 percent of average contract length. This pattern suggests that the tax benefits associated with long term contracts promoted artificial contract lengthening prior to passage of the 1986 Act. The evidence is consistent with a behavioral model in which the Department of Defense ignores the federal income tax consequences of its procurement actions, thereby indirectly rewarding contractors who are able to benefit from tax expenditures of various types. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14146 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571821 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Susan Guthrie,James R. Hines, Jr.. U.S. Defense Contracts During the Tax Expenditure Battles of the 1980s. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14146.pdf（151KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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