G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w14153
来源IDWorking Paper 14153
Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice
M. Kate Bundorf; Jonathan D. Levin; Neale Mahoney
发表日期2008-06-27
出版年2008
语种英语
摘要Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options.
主题Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w14153
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571827
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GB/T 7714
M. Kate Bundorf,Jonathan D. Levin,Neale Mahoney. Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice. 2008.
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