| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14153 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14153 |
| Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice | |
| M. Kate Bundorf; Jonathan D. Levin; Neale Mahoney | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14153 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571827 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | M. Kate Bundorf,Jonathan D. Levin,Neale Mahoney. Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14153.pdf（602KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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