| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14226 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14226 |
| Inventor Moral Hazard in University Licensing: The Role of Contracts | |
| Emmanuel Dechenaux; Jerry Thursby; Marie C. Thursby | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-08-14 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine commonly observed forms of payment, such as milestones, royalties, or consulting contracts as ways of engaging inventors in the development of licensed inventions. Our theoretical model shows that when milestones are feasible, royalties are not optimal unless the licensing firm is risk averse. The model also predicts the use of consulting contracts which improve the firm's ability to monitor inventor effort. Because these contracts increase the firm's expected profits, the upfront fee that the university can charge is higher than otherwise. These results therefore support the commonly observed university policy of allowing faculty to consult with licensing firms outside of their university contracts. They also support firm policies of including milestones. An empirical analysis based on a survey of 112 businesses that license-in university inventions supports the complementarity of milestones and consulting suggested by the theory. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14226 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571899 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emmanuel Dechenaux,Jerry Thursby,Marie C. Thursby. Inventor Moral Hazard in University Licensing: The Role of Contracts. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14226.pdf（225KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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